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CAMPUS CRUSADE FOR CHRIST V.
METROPOLITIAN WATER DISTRICT
Nathan Hall*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Metropolitan Water District of Southern California v.
Campus Crusade for Christ (Campus Crusade), the Supreme
Court of California examined the burden of proof in eminent
domain actions with respect to establishing a reasonable
probability of a zoning change, and determining a
landowner's entitlement to severance damages. 1
Just
compensation is a constitutionally protected right both in
California 2 and under the U.S. constitution.3 Consistent and
proper adjudication of eminent domain cases brought before
the State is vital to protecting the right of just compensation.4
Although the California Supreme Court resolved several
issues in Campus Crusade, this casenote will focus on the
issues relating to the burden of proof and burden of
production with respect to establishing the reasonable
probability of a zoning change. First, this casenote will
discuss California's legislative and judicial treatment of the
issue of burden of proof in eminent domain actions.5 Second,
this casenote will present the background facts and holding of
* Articles Editor, Santa Clara University Law Review, Volume 48; J.D.
Candidate 2008, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.S., Architecture,
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
1. Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc., 161
P.3d 1175 (Cal. 2007).
2. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19; 1 NORMAN E. MATTEONI & HENRY VEIT,
CONDEMNATION PRACTICE IN CALIFORNIA § 4.1, at 80-81 (3d ed. 2005).
3.

U.S. CONST. amendv.

4. 40 AM. JUR. 3D Proofof Facts § 2 (1997) ("The most important limitation
on the government's power of eminent domain is contained in the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution . . .which requires payment of
just compensation for the property taken.").
5. See supra Part I.A.
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Campus Crusade.6 Finally, this casenote will examine the
court's decision and evaluate its potential effects on future
condemnation litigation and legislation in California.'
A.

PriorJudicialand Legislative Treatment

In 1976, the Legislature amended section 1260.210(b) of
the California Code of Civil Procedure to state "neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant has the burden of proof on the
issue of compensation."8 Much like severance damages, 9 the
probability of a zone change will affect the amount of
compensation required to be given in. exchange for the
condemned property and presumably falls within the scope of
section 1260.210(b).' 0 Imposing a burden on a condemnee

to show a reasonable probability of a zoning change to
receive the property's highest value is necessarily a
burden on the issue of compensation. Section 1260.210
revised previous case law, holding that there was a burden of
proof on the issue of compensation."
The comments to
section 1260.210(b) state that "[alssignment of the burden of
proof in the context of an eminent domain proceeding is not
appropriate." 2 Despite the amendment, California courts
continued to allocate the burden of proof on the issue of
compensation to the condemnee."
6. See supra Part I.B-D.
7. See supra Part II.
8. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1260.210(b) (West 2007).
9. Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc., 161
P.3d 1175 (Cal. 2007) ("Severance damages

. . . consist generally of the

diminution in the fair market value of the remainder property caused by the
project ... [sleverance damages are not limited to special and direct damages,
but can be based on any factor, resulting from the project, that causes a decline
in the fair market value of the property.") (citing L.A. County Metro. Transp.
Auth. v. Cont'l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d 809 (1997)); see generally Memorandum
2000-40, Cal. L. Revis'n Comm'n, Offset of Benefits in Partial Taking in
Eminent
Domain
(Apr.
21,
2000),
available
at
http//www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/2000/MMOO-40.pdf (noting that severance damages
might include damages that result "from leaving an undersized, mis-shapen, or
landlocked remnant.").
10. 1 MATTEONI & VEIT, supra note 2, § 9.45.
11.

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1260.210(b), L. Revis'n Comm'n Comments,

1975 Addition (West 2007). ("The rule as to burden of proof provided by
subsection (b) changes former law.").
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Decker, 558 P.2d 545, 549 (Cal. 1977); City of
San Diego v. D.R. Horton San Diego Holding Co., 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 338, 346 (Ct.
App. 2005); Redev. Agency v. Contra Costa Theater, Inc. 185 Cal. Rptr. 159, 165
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Case law prior to the 1976 amendment shows that a
burden did exist. For example, in People ex rel. Department of
Public Works v. Arthofer, the court imposed the burden of
proof on the defendant landowner to show a reasonable
probability of a zone change.14 The unimproved parcel, taken
for freeway purposes, was designated R-1 use 5 as of the date
of valuation.' 6 The court overruled the landowner who
claimed that he purchased the land for R-3 use.' 7 Arthofer
states the traditional rule plainly: "The burden of proof as to
reasonable probability of zone change is on the landowner."' 8
On the cusp of the Legislature's amendment to section
1260.210 of the California Code of Civil Procedure in 1977,
the California Supreme Court decided City of Los Angeles v.
Decker.'9 In Decker, the landowner's home was condemned
for construction of a public airport. 20 The homeowner sought
to show that although her home was zoned R-1, 21 zoning rules
permitted a rezoning of the area if certain conditions could be
shown.2 2 Relying on Arthofer, the trial court had held that
The California4
the burden rested on the landowner. 23
2
Supreme Court ordered a new trial after appeal and hearing
and advised the trial court of the amendment to section
1260.210.25 Although the subsequent reversal came after the
operative date of the amendment, Decker ultimately upheld
previous case law that the burden to show a reasonable
probability of a zoning change fell on the landowners.2 6
After 1977, other courts followed Decker and held that a
(Ct. App. 1982).
14. People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Arthofer, 54 Cal. Rptr. 878, 884 (Ct.
App. 1966).
15. Id. at 881 ("[U]nder the ordinance involved herein, R-1 permits
construction of single-family residential dwellings.").
16. Id.
17. Id. ("An R-3 zone classification authorizes uses permitted by an R-1 zone
together with the construction of apartments, day-care nurseries, private clubs,
rest homes, and private schools.").
18. Id. at 884.
19. City of L.A. v. Decker, 558 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1977).
20. Id. at 546.
21. Id. at 549 (describing R-1 use as single family residential).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 552.
25. City of L.A. v. Decker, 558 P.2d 545, 552 (Cal. 1977); 1 MATTEONI &
VEIT, supra note 2, § 9.45.
26. 1 MATTEONI & VEIT, supra note 2, § 9.45
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landowner carries the burden of proof to show the probability
of a zoning change." In Redevelopment Agency of Concord v.
Contra Costa Theater, Inc.,28 the defendant sought to show
that a use permit for a multi-screen theater was reasonably
probable and therefore his property should be valued in
accordance with that use.2 9 In its opinion, the court did not
refer to the statute, but instead cited the holding in Decker.3 °
As recent as 2005, a California court held that the property
owner bears the burden of showing a reasonable probability
of a zone change. 1 In City of San Diego v. D.R. Horton San
Diego Holding Co., a landowner held the burden of showing
that there was a reasonable probability of a zoning change in
order to recover the "highest and best use" of the land.3 2
In contrast, some California courts imposed no burden,
even prior to the 1976 amendment.3 In City of PleasantHill
v. First Baptist Church,3 4 the court allowed the jury to hear
and determine the weight of witness testimony relevant to
the probability of a zone change.
Allowing a jury to
determine the probability of a zoning change is more akin to
the standard of proof contemplated by the current statute. 6
Rather than imposing a burden on either the plaintiff or the
defendant, the court allows both parties to present their
evidence independently.
A trier of fact must examine the
conflicting evidence and fix a value based on the weight and

27. See, e.g., City of San Diego v. D.R. Horton San Diego Holding Co., 24
Cal. Rptr. 3d 338 (Ct. App. 2005); Redev. Agency v. Contra Costa Theater, Inc.
185 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Ct. App. 1982).
28. Contra Costa Theater, 185 Cal. Rptr. 159.
29. Id. at 166-67.
30. Id. at 165 ("The burden of establishing a 'reasonable probability' of a
change in allowed use is on the landowner.").
31. D.R. Horton San Diego Holding Co., 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 346.
32. Id.
33. E.g., City of Pleasant Hill v. First Baptist Church, 82 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Ct.
App. 1969).
34. Id.
35. See id. at 21-22 (holding that it was not prejudicial error to introduce
evidence that a nearby landowner had bought, rezoned and sold land for profit,
despite the fact that the landowner had not checked with the planning
commission or city council about rezoning).
36. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1260.210(b), L. Revis'n Comm'n Comments
(should these be small caps?), 1975 Addition (West 2007).
37. See id.; see also 1 MATTEONI & VEIT, supra note 2, § 9.14 ("The law
assumes that all appraisal information, admitted from either side, is to be given
the jury for its independent determination.").
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credibility of the evidence." Eliminating the burden of proof
removes any deference the condemnee must overcome to the
condemnor to prove the amount of compensation sought by
the condemnee 9
Compounding the confusion of this rule is the imprecision
with which the standard of evidence is measured. It is
unclear whether the burden of proof required in these cases
functions as a burden of persuasion40 or a burden of
production.4' The actual standard of evidence set forth in
Decker is substantively low: "[T]he evidence must at least be
in accordance with the usual minimum evidentiary
requirements, and that which is purely speculative, wholly
guess work and conjectural, is inadmissible."4 2 Cases like
Contra Costa Theater echo this substantively low burden by
referring to it as a "minimum evidentiary requirement[]." 4
Presumably, any evidence based on objective findings will
pass this threshold. Nonetheless, courts that do not impose a
burden of proof nevertheless impose a threshold standard of a
reasonableprobability of a zoning change."
B. FactualBackground of Campus Crusade
Metropolitan Water District (MWD) is a consortium of
twenty-six cities and water districts that provides water to
various parts of Southern California.45 MWD condemned the
land interest in question in order to construct a water
pipeline that would carry water from MWD's facility in Devil
Canyon in San Bernardino County to its East Side reservoir
in Diamond Valley Lake in Riverside County. 46 The twelve-

38. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1260.210(b), L. Revis'n Comm'n Comments,

1975 Addition (West 2007).
1 MATTEONI & VEIT, supra note 2, § 9.14.
40. The burden of persuasion is "the notion that if the evidence is evenly
balanced, the party that bears the burden of persuasion must lose." Metro.
Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc., 161 P.3d 1175, 1183
(Cal. 2007).
41. The burden of production is "a party's obligation to come forward with
evidence to support its claim." Campus Crusade, 161 P.3d at 1183.
42. City of L.A. v. Decker, 558 P.2d 545, 549 (Cal. 1977).
43. Redev. Agency v. Contra Costa Theater, Inc., 185 Cal. Rptr. 159, 165
(Ct. App. 1982).
44. E.g., Martens v. State, 554 P.2d 407, 409 (Alaska 1976).
45. Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, httpJ/www.mwdh2o
.com! mw dh2o/pages/about/about0l.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
46. Brief of Appellants at 1, Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. Campus
39.
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foot diameter, forty-three mile long pipeline is a significant
project requiring equally significant construction.4 7
The
construction, which runs through property owned by Campus
Crusade, includes a tunnel along the northwest portion of
Campus Crusade's property, and transitions to a pipeline that
runs to the southeast and then to the south through Campus
Crusade's property.48
Although most of the actual pipeline is buried hundreds
of feet below ground, portions of the pipe rise steeply and
come close to the surface. 49 Thus, MWD required permanent
easements not only below ground, but above ground as well,
for the purpose of "constructing, reconstructing, maintaining,
[and] operating.., a line or lines of pipe at any time .... "50
Campus Crusade owned approximately 1,824 acres in the
area in and around San Bernardino County, California. 1 The
portion of the land relevant to this case is zoned RC. 52
Roughly 420 acres of the property is also located in San
Bernardino's sphere of influence, which is potentially subject
to rezoning by the city, however only after annexation.
Campus Crusade's existing buildings are currently located in
the RC zone as legal non-conforming uses.54 Campus Crusade
asserts that it had decided, in 1996, to hire a developer for
comprehensive development of the property 55 and gained
political support for the development. 6 Because of the land's
prospective development, Campus Crusade asserts that a
reasonable probability of a zoning change existed at the time
of valuation. 7 If such a probability existed, Campus Crusade
Crusade for Christ, Inc., 161 P.3d 1175 (Cal. 2007) (No. E034248).
47. Id.

48. Brief of Respondent at 1, Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. Campus
Crusade for Christ, Inc., 161 P.3d 1175 (Cal. 2007) (No. E034248).
49. Brief of Appellants, supra note 46, at 1.

50. Id. at 9.
51. Brief of Appellants, supra note 46, at 5.

52. Brief of Respondent, supra note 48, at 1. RC (Resource Conservation)
zoning allows for agricultural and residential use with a minimum lot size of
forty acres per dwelling. Id.
53. Id. at 12. The "sphere of influence" is a planning tool that enables the
city to pre-zone land, however zoning is ineffective until that land is annexed to
the city. Id. at 13.
54. Id. at 10.
55. Brief of Appellants, supra note 46, at 6-7.
56. Id. at 5.
57. Id. at 8. Campus Crusade's expert appraiser opined that "prior to
December, 1996, and to the present day there has been a probability that: (a)
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would be entitled to just compensation based on the land's
more valuable use.
C. ProceduralHistory
In 1997, MWD condemned land owned by Campus
Crusade for its Inland Feeder Project.58 The Project's primary
objective is to transfer water from Devil Canyon to Diamond
5
Valley Lake in Southern California9.
On December 10, 1996,
MWD's Board of Directors adopted a resolution of necessity
and thirteen days later, MWD deposited $320,000 in the
State Treasury, thereby establishing the date of valuation. °
MWD formally brought the eminent domain action to
condemn the land required for the pipeline on January 23,
1997.61 Soon thereafter, Campus Crusade had the condemned
land appraised at an estimated value between $1,500,000 and
$1,600,000,
along with severance damages between
$1,900,000 and $2,000,0002 and other compensable or
"temporary" damages between $10,700,000 and $12,100,000.63
Campus Crusade's appraisers based these calculations on
zone changes.64 In total, Campus Crusade made an original
demand of $15,000,000 against MWD's offer of $1,500,000.65
Subsequently, Campus Crusade revised its offer, demanding
$12,500,000.66
Before trial, MWD filed several in limine motions
regarding evidence of temporary severance damages.6 7 Judge
Ludvigsen ruled in favor of Campus Crusade and allowed the
introduction of evidence of severance damages.68 After ruling

the Campus Crusade property would ultimately be annexed to the City; and (b)
as part of that annexation it could be zoned or approved for uses compatible
with the development concept which has been presented by the developer to the
City ....1"Id.
58. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 48, at 5.
59. Id. at 3.
60. Id. at 5; see also CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1263.110 (West 2007); see
generally 1 MATTEONI & VEIT, supra note 2, § 4.22 (explaining the importance of
the valuation date in determining fair market value).
61. Brief of Respondent, supra note 48, at 5.
62. Id.
63. Id.; see generally supra note 5 and accompanying text.
64. Brief of Respondent, supra note 48, at 5.
65. Id. at 5-6.
66. Id. at 5.
67. See id. at 6.
68. See id.; Brief of Appellants, supra note 46, at 3.
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on several pretrial motions, the court reassigned Judge
Ludvigsen to another department and appointed Judge Wade
as her replacement.69 Asking Judge Wade to reconsider the
admission of evidence concerning valuation, MWD made ten
more in limine motions, several of which addressed issues
previously decided by Judge Ludvigsen. 0° On August 21,
2002, Judge Wade reviewed rulings on several issues.7 1
Among them was the introduction of evidence regarding a
After an
reasonable probability of a zoning change.7 2
evidentiary hearing, Judge Wade found that there was
insufficient evidence to show a reasonable probability of a
As a result of these rulings, Campus
zoning change.73
Crusade waived its right to a jury trial and lowered its
MWD's final offer came on
demand to $5,380,000.1'
November 7, 2002, containing two alternatives: $3,500,000
with Campus Crusade retaining the right to seek damages
resulting from construction, or $4,500,000 with a waiver for
any severance damages against MWD resulting from
construction.75
At trial, Judge Wade awarded Campus Crusade
$478,278.45, an amount exclusive of severance damages.7 6
On appeal, Campus Crusade argued that Judge Wade's
rulings erroneously overturned Judge Ludvigsen's rulings on
MWD insisted that Judge Wade's
evidentiary issues.7 7
rulings were proper because they did not contradict Judge
Ludvigsen's rulings and they were correct as a matter of
78
law.
First, the appellate court reviewed Judge Wade's rulings
pertaining to evidentiary issues regarding severance
damages.7 9 The court found that Judge Wade's rulings on the
motions in limine were generally inconsistent with those of
69. Brief of Respondent, supra note 48, at 7.
70. See id. at 9.
71. Id. at 7.
72. Id. at 9.
73. Brief of Appellants, supra note 46, at 11-12.
74. Id. at 12; Brief of Respondent, supra note 48, at 8.
75. Brief of Respondent, supra note 48, at 8.
76. Brief of Appellants, supra note 46, at 12.
77. Id. at 14-19.
78. Brief of Respondent, supra note 48, at 9-53.
79. Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc., 37 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 598, 610-11 (Ct. App. 2005) (including damages claimed for the danger
of pipeline rupture, the loss of mature trees, and the delay in construction).
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Judge Ludvigsen. °
Second, the appellate court addressed the burden of proof
issue.8 1 Here, the appellate court also reversed, finding that
the trial court erred by imposing on Campus Crusade not only
the burden of production, but also the burden of proof on
certain evidentiary issues.8 2 However, the court expressly
noted that "based on [post-1976] cases, it remains unclear
whether the property owner bears the 'burden of proof as to
the preliminary facts necessary to support his claim for
compensation in light of the 1975 statute. '3
Third, the appellate court examined the jury's role with
respect to the evidentiary rulings.'M
The appellate court
found that, although the trial court has discretion to
determine the admissibility of evidence, it may not usurp the
role of the jury as it did in the case. 5
Fourth, the appellate court reviewed Campus Crusade's
assertion that the trial court abused the "most injurious use"
standard. 6 The appellate court found error in the trial
court's decision to exclude evidence of certain potential
damages such as those damages caused by the delay in
construction, the interference with access rights, and the risk
of rupture.8 7
Fifth, the appellate court reviewed Campus Crusade's
contention that the trial court failed to consider the highest
and best use of the property. 8 The highest and best use in
this case was contingent on Campus Crusade's evidence of a
zoning change which would have resulted in a more profitable
use. 9 The appellate court again found error by Judge Wade.9 0

80. See id. (holding that Judge Wade's rulings were inconsistent with Judge
Ludvigsen's rulings with the exception of rulings regarding the loss of mature
trees).
81. Id. at 611-15.
82. Id. at 615.
83. Id. at 613.
84. Id. at 615-16.
85. Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc., 37 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 598, 616 (Ct. App. 2005),("[T]he court went beyond simply determining
the admissibility of evidence.").
86. Id. at 616-18. Under the "most injurious use" standard, "in order to
assess the value of the remaining property, the trier of fact must consider the
most injurious use of the property that was taken." Id. at 616.
87. Id. at 618.
88. Id. at 618-22.
89. Id. at 618.
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First, it held that Judge Ludvigsen had already found that
the evidence concerning a zoning change was not
speculative.9 ' Second, it held that such a determination is
normally a question of fact for the jury, not the judge.92
Third, the court held that the role of the trial judge
concerning evidence of possible rezoning is to ensure that the
evidence is not purely speculative,9 3 rather than to evaluate
the decision based on whether or not there will ultimately be
a favorable finding.94 The appellate court then reexamined
the evidence presented by Campus Crusade, which showed a
reasonable probability of a zoning change, and found that it
satisfied the threshold requirement of admissibility. 95
Finally, the court examined the admissibility of evidence
showing severance damages.9 6 By granting MWD's in limine
motions, the trial court excluded all evidence of certain
severance damage items.9 7 The appellate court reversed
several evidentiary rulings, 9 and ultimately held that the
trial court applied an incorrect standard in deciding whether
to allow certain evidence to reach a jury.99
Following the appellate court's decision, MWD petitioned
the California Supreme Court, which granted review on four
of the issues.'0 0
D. Holding of Campus Crusade
The California Supreme Court consolidated the four
issues presented by the parties into two main holdings: the
first regarding the reasonable probability of rezoning, and the
second regarding severance damages. 1 '
The court first examined the judge's role in determining
90. Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc., 37 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 598, 618-20 (Ct. App. 2005).
91. Id. at 609.
92. Id. at 619.
93. Id. at 620.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 621-22.
96. Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc., 37 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 598, 622-27 (Ct. App. 2005).
97. Id. at 622.
98. Id. at 622, 624.
99. Id. at 627.
100. Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc., 161
P.3d 1175, 1180 (Cal. 2007).
101. Id.

CAMPUS CRUSADE
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the reasonable probability of a zoning change. °2 The court
held that Judge Wade usurped the role of the jury by
declaring that "it is not reasonably probable that the subject
property would be rezoned in the reasonably near future,"
and by excluding Campus Crusade's evidence of rezoning. 10 '
Next, the court distinguished the various burdens.0 4 The
court held that section 1260.210 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure requires the landowner to produce evidence to
support an alleged rezoning.15 Neither party, however, bears
a particular burden to persuade a jury on the evidence, or of
the effect any probability of rezoning might have on the
property's value.10 6 The California Supreme Court concluded
that the trial court erred in "deciding, prior to trial, whether
it was convinced there was a reasonable probability of
rezoning," rather than allowing a jury to decide this
10 7
question.
Finally, the court addressed the issue of severance
damages. 08 After disposing of most of the issues concerning
severance damages, the court turned to Campus Crusade's
attempt to recover severance damages for its alleged inability
to "use, develop, and market its property during the sevenyear period of construction."'0 9 Ultimately, the court held
that to recover severance damages Campus Crusade must
allege interference with Campus Crusade's actual intended
use of the property, and identify a specific loss attributable to
the interference. 10

II. ANALYSIS OF THE CAMPUS CRUSADE DECISION
The following discussion focuses on the court's analysis
regarding the burden of proof or production on a property
owner claiming a reasonable probability of a zoning change,
and discusses the implications that Campus Crusade will

102. Id. at 1181-84.
103. Id. at 1181.
104. Id. at 1183.
105. Id. at 1183.
106. Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc., 161
P.3d 1175, 1183 (Cal. 2007).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1184-87.
109. Id. at 1186.
110. Id. at 1187.

518

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Voh:48

have on future eminent domain litigation in California.11 1
Before trial, MWD's in limine motion was granted on the
rezoning issue. 112 Judge Wade found that "it [was] not
reasonably probable that the subject property would be
Judge Wade
rezoned in the reasonably near future." 3
excluded the evidence of possible rezoning because he found
that Campus Crusade had failed to present substantial
evidence, outside of the jury's presence, of a reasonable
probability of rezoning for a higher and better use." 4 As a
result, Campus Crusade's expert appraisers were required11to
5
value the remaining property based on the current RC use.
In its analysis, the court first clarified the proper
1 6
standard for admitting evidence of probable rezoning. 1
Although determining a reasonable probability of rezoning is
normally a question for the jury, "the trial court must first
determine whether there is sufficient evidence that would
permit a jury to conclude there is a reasonable probability of
rezoning in the near future."" 7 Thus, in order to reach a jury
for determination, the evidence of rezoning must meet certain
minimum requirements.1 8 If the court determines that the
evidence is sufficient to warrant submitting the issue to the
jury, the jury must make two determinations: (1) whether the
proffered evidence demonstrates a reasonable probability of
rezoning, and (2) if so, the effect of rezoning on the property's
market value.1 9
After reviewing the proper standard, the court examined
the conflicting standard articulated in recent case law. In
County of San Diego v. Rancho Vista Del Mar,120 the court
held that "[t]he property owner has the burden of showing a
111. This casenote does not analyze the court's treatment on the issue of
severance damages.
112. Campus Crusade, 161 P.3d at 1181.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1181; see supra text accompanying note 51.
116. Id. at 1181-82.
117. Id. at 1182.
118. Campus Crusade, 161 P.3d at 1182. If the trial court determines that
'no fact finder could find a reasonable probability of rezoning... it may exclude
all evidence and opinions of value based on a use other than that authorized by
existing zoning." Id.
119. Id. at 1182.
120. County of San Diego v. Rancho Vista Del Mar, Inc., 16 Cal. App. 4th
1046, 1058 (Ct. App. 1993).
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reasonable probability of a change in the restrictions on the
property."1 2 '
The court then addressed the applicability of conflicting
case law in light of section 1260.210 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure, which expressly states that neither party
122
"has the burden of proof on the issue of compensation."
Thus, the standard expressed in Rancho Vista is at odds with
section 1260.210.
Noting that the term "burden of proof' is often the
subject of confusion, 123 the court examined the language of
section 1260.210 to interpret its meaning.
The court
explained that, historically, other courts have used the term
"burden of proof' to describe two distinct concepts: (1) the
25
burden of persuasion'24 and (2) the burden of production.
After examining the conflicting interpretations, the court
concluded that the burden articulated under section 1260.210
is a burden of production. 126 In particular, the court stated
that subdivision (b) should be interpreted as a burden of
production with respect to convincing the trier of fact that the
reasonable probability of rezoning exists. 127
Without
overturning recent case law, the court interpreted cases like
Rancho Vista and its progeny, as articulating a burden of
1 28
production rather than persuasion.
Finally, the court described the correct procedure that
the trial court should have used:
[Tihe trial court should [have] examine[d] whether the
proffer supplies sufficient evidence to permit the jury to
121. Id.
122. Campus Crusade, 161 P.3d at 1183; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1260.210(b)

(West 2007).
123. Campus Crusade, 161 P.3d at 1183 (explaining the confusion among
attorneys, judges and commentators in defining "burden of proof').

124. Id. ("[Tihe burden of persuasion [is] the notion that if the evidence is
evenly balanced, the party that bears the burden of persuasion must lose.").
125. Id. ("[Tihe burden of production [is] a party's obligation to come forward
with evidence to support its claim.").
126. Id. at 1183. In support of its interpretation, the court cited the Law
Revision Commission Comments to section 1260.210, which state that "[a]bsent
the production of evidence by one party, the trier of fact will determine
compensation solely from the other party's evidence, but neither party should be
made to appear to bear some greater burden of persuasion than the other."
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1260.210(b), L. Revis'n Comm'n Comments, 1975
Addition (West 2007).
127. Campus Crusade, 161 P.3d at 1183.
128. Id.
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find that there was a reasonable probability of rezoning to
permit that use in the near future. The jury should then
be instructed that it may consider the change in use,
the
provided that it first finds a reasonable probability
129
property could be rezoned in the near future.
On remand, the trial court will review Campus Crusade's
evidence under a less rigorous standard to determine whether
130
a jury could find a reasonable probability of zoning change.
Ultimately, the disposition of this case will help ensure
proper adjudication of eminent domain cases. The singular
role of the jury in an eminent domain action is to determine
the amount of compensation for a taking.131 However small,
the importance of this role cannot be overstated; the jury
protects the landowner's constitutional right to receive just
compensation.3 2 To arrive at the most accurate measure of
just compensation, the jury must be allowed to consider all
relevant factors bearing on the property's fair market value.
With the rapid increase of contemporary development
and the growing popularity of mixed use developments such
as the one proposed by Campus Crusade, the court's decision
will have growing significance on the method landowners'
appraisers use to value condemned land. Due to the growing
probability that any given plot of rural land will be rezoned in
the near future to accommodate development, more
landowners will be able to reasonably argue that condemned
land should be valued as effectively rezoned for a higher use.
At the very least, landowners could assert that increased
between 33 a
negotiations
affect
would
development
land.
rural
such
of
acquisition
the
for
buyer"
"hypothetical

129. Id. at 1183.
130. Id.
131. 1 MATTEONI & VEIT, supra note 2, § 9.47 ("The court decides all
questions in eminent domain trials except determination of compensation.").
132. CAL. CONST. art. 1, §19.
133. A "hypothetical buyer" is relevant because the standard for highest and
best use assumes the price of the land agreed upon by a hypothetical buyer and

seller, both willing and both having full knowledge of all the uses and purposes
for which the property is reasonably adapted. See People ex rel. State Public
Works Bd. v. Talleur, 145 Cal. Rptr. 150, 152 (Ct. App. 1978). The reasonable
adaptability of a property includes any reasonable probability of a zoning
change in the near future. Id.
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III. CONCLUSION

Despite the confusion resulting from the conflict between
existing case law and the amendment to section 1260.210, the
California Supreme Court ultimately held in accord with the
plain language of the statute. A landowner asserting that
there is a reasonable probability of rezoning for a higher and
better use bears the burden to produce evidence sufficient
that a reasonable jury could find that such a probability
burden to
exists."' Neither party, however, bears a greater
135
prove that rezoning is reasonably probable or not.
The court's articulated standard is similar to the directed
verdict standard. 136 The judge must determine whether a
jury could find that there is a reasonable probability of
rezoning.137 Thus, the directed verdict standard may serve as
a useful indicator of treatment by future courts of this
evidentiary standard. Courts do not often grant directed
verdicts because of the low threshold required to defeat a
directed verdict motion. 138 If courts take a similar approach
to rezoning evidence and apply the low standard that
currently applies to directed verdicts,,139 the amount of
rezoning evidence that will reach a jury is likely to increase.
Campus Crusade clarified the proper standard that
California courts should use in evaluating evidence used by a
landowner to receive compensation for the property's most
valuable potential use. This decision brings courts a step
closer to ensuring that landowners receive just compensation.
Its significance will continue to increase as public
development reaches exceedingly rural areas that are subject
to zoning changes to a more valuable use, in order to
accommodate growth. In more cases, a court will be required
to determine the probability of a zoning change and in only
the most remote and undeveloped areas will this standard be
134. Campus Crusade, 161 P.3d at 1183.
135. Id.
136. Santa Clara Valley Distrib. Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 556 F.2d 942, 945
(9th Cir. 1977) ("[A] directed verdict is only granted when [the court determines
that] no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.").
137. Campus Crusade, 161 P.3d at 1183.
138. See J. Palmer Lockard, Summary Judgment in Pennsylvania: Time for
Another Look at Credibility Issues, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 625, 652 (1997).
139. Robert P. Burns, Notes on the Future of Evidence Law, 74 TEMP. L. REV.
69, 79 (2001) (discussing the low standard applied to directed verdicts).
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